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Since the seminal paper by Allingham and Sandmo (1972) the theoretical
microeconomic approach to tax evasion has almost exclusively treated only
personal income tax and, more recently and with fewer examples, profit
taxes (e.g. Kreutzer and Lee, 1986;or: Lee, 1997). The evasion of indirect
taxes, and more precisely of value added tax (VAT), is an almost
unexplored topic for microeconomic theory, and the few papers that have
explicitly treated it from a theoretical perspective (e.g. Marrelli, 1984) have
done so within the production theory framework, i.e. once again as part of a
problem of profit maximisation. None of these works analyse those
interesting aspects of VAT evasion tied to the highly social nature of this
kind of tax evasion. The social-psychological dimension of tax evasion is
not a new topic, and it has been widely analysed from both the theoretical
(e.g. Gordon, 1989) and the empirical-experimental perspectives (e.g.
Webley, P.Robben, H., Elffers, H. and Hessing, D., 1991; Bosco, Mittone,
1997), but once again this literature refers only to income tax.
The most distinctive characteristic of the evasion of VAT is that it
typically involves three actors – the seller, the buyer and the state – whereas
in the evasion of income tax the interaction concerns only the taxpayer and
the state. The interaction among these three agents may give rise to the
following phenomena:
3a) the taxpayer, i.e. the buyer of a given good or service, can evade only if
s/he is able to collude with the seller, who should behave as tax
collector for the state.
b) The collusion between the seller and the buyer is facilitated by the
mutual advantage accruing to the two agents from the collusion. By
colluding, in fact, both agents can reduce their fiscal burdens: the buyer
does not pay the VAT and the seller can declare an income lower than
the real one because s/he under-reports the amount of his/her business,
and consequently must pay less profit tax.
c) The seller can decide to confiscate the tax yield that she has collected
from his/her buyers.
According to point (b) the seller has a double incentive to evade: the first
is a market incentive due to the opportunity to be more competitive by
selling at prices lower than the gross prices (i.e. VAT included) charged by
the other sellers; the second is to reduce the burden of his/her profit tax by
hiding the real volume of his/her business. Note that both these incentives
for collusion (and therefore for evasion) may be nullified if the seller
decides to adopt the strategy described at point (c). For terminological
clarity, henceforth I shall define the seller’s appropriation of  the VAT yield
collected from his/her clients as “VAT expropriation”.
A second interesting point related to VAT evasion is that the state may
introduce incentives intended to induce agents to complain, i.e. forms of
reward for agents who report attempts to involve them in collusion. To be
effective, the incentives introduced by the state to encourage the reporting
4of collusion attempts, by either buyers or sellers, should balance the just
described incentives to collude, and they therefore should be carefully
planned. On the other hand, many national legislatures (Italy’s for example)
have serious lawmaking problems with regard to these kinds of incentive for
informing on miscreants. How to incentivize the denunciation of  collusion
attempts will not be treated here, given that it would extend the discussion
beyond the scope of this paper.
A final point investigated here regards risky behaviour. In previous
experiments carried out on income tax evasion (Mittone, 1999) an
interesting recursive phenomenon was observed in every experiment: a sort
of “bomb crater” effect. The term “bomb crater” is taken from the practice
of soldiers during the first world war to seek refuge in the craters made by
bombs that had just fallen. The soldiers believed that it was almost
impossible for another bomb to fall in exactly the same place. Similarly, in
Mittone (1999) the tax payers evaded immediately after the fiscal audit even
if the probability of being detected was totally independent of previous tax
audits.
Does the more complex environment of VAT evasion produce different
effects on the experimental subjects’ attitude toward risk? Or does the bomb
crater effect persist even in the VAT context?
The approach chosen here to analyse VAT evasion is an experimental
one. The main advantage offered by the experimental approach is that it
enables  isolation of each of the aspects just described and  empirical
investigation into the individual roles played by these factors in influencing
VAT evasion.
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The theoretical aspects to be treated before passing to the experimental
investigation are closely related to the solution of questions arising from the
just described characteristics of VAT evasion. These questions are the
following:
1) assuming that the sellers operate in some form of imperfect competition
market (i.e. assuming that they can fix their selling price) what is the
seller’s optimal price-collusion-evasion strategy?
2) Which is the optimal collusion-evasion choice for the buyer?
3) Does the traditional tax evasion theory fit with the seller’s decisional
problem of keeping the indirect tax yield collected from his/her buyers?
Although these three questions seem to represent new theoretical topics,
more accurate analysis shows that they are all easily manageable within the
framework of the traditional Alligham-Sandmo model. In fact, unless we
introduce into the collusion mechanism some form of asymmetrical
advantage for the agents - for example, some form of reward for the agent
that decides to denounce an attempt at collusion by the other agent - the
decisional problem is very similar to that of income tax evasion.
Both the buyer and the seller can consider VAT evasion from the same
perspective of income tax evasion because VAT reduces the disposable
income exactly as income tax does. The main difference is that the VAT
burden is proportional to the price of the good purchased, while income tax
6is generally progressively tied to the income level. But this difference does
not alter the ingredients of the tax payer problem, which are the same as
originally included in the classic Allingham-Sandmo model, i.e. the amount
of tax due, amount of the fine to pay if detected, and the probability of being
audited.
Another difference between VAT evasion and the traditional theoretical
framework of income tax evasion concerns the sellers only. The
expropriation of the VAT yield collected by the sellers is linked to the
decision to evade profit taxes and can therefore be seen as part of production
choices. As anticipated in the introduction, VAT expropriation can be
handled within production theory by looking at the literature on profit tax
evasion. This topic will not be treated here, because the focus of this paper
is on collusion between sellers and buyers and on the effects thus produced
on the market dynamic. More precisely, it is assumed here that the sellers
are not concerned with production choices and therefore make choices that
closely resemble those taken in the income tax environment.
In spite of the apparently traditional setting in which the evasion of
indirect taxation should be framed, this is nevertheless an innovative
perspective on the actual behaviour adopted by human actors when
confronted with an opportunity to break the law. The interest of indirect
evasion resides in the quite complex psychological context in which it takes
place. As said at the outset, many experiments on the evasion of income tax
have shown that the decision to evade is influenced by psychological factors
that may profoundly modify the results of the decisional process of the
taxpayers. These factors, which depend on the social dimension of the
7decision to evade income tax, are even more crucial in a context like that of
indirect taxes, where evasion becomes much more explicit than is normally
the case in income tax evasion.
Furthermore, the strong psychological impact of indirect tax evasion is a
major problem, not only for the buyer, who must obtain the complicity of
the seller to be able to evade, but also for the seller, when s/he decides to
keep the money collected instead of paying it to the state. In fact, when the
seller keeps the money paid as tax, s/he is stealing from both the buyer and
the state, and it is therefore reasonable to suppose that awareness of his/her
unfair behaviour will be stronger than in the case of income tax.
On the other hand, and this time with regard to the buyer, one can argue
that the subjective perception of paying a tax is weaker in the case of
indirect taxes than it is in the case of income tax. The relatively weaker
psychological perception of the fiscal burden caused by the indirect taxes
may be due to the fact that tax payers generally consider indirect tax to be
an inseparable part of the price that they are paying for a given good.
Conversely, in the case of income tax, tax payers clearly see the amount of
money that is being taking away from their income.
The basic theoretical framework used here is a simplified version of
Allingham and Sandmo’s static model.1 Taxpayers’ choices (by both buyers
and sellers ) are taken with a view to the expected monetary value that they
can extract from evasion, and every choice is independent of previous
decisions and subsequent ones. Time independence is ensured by the
following assumption:
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 For more detailed description of the theoretical frame see Mittone, 1999.
8H1) the fiscal authority does not take the past behaviour of the taxpayers into
account when determining either the fiscal audit probability or the fee to be
applied in the case of evasion.
In order to concentrate only on monetary income, it is useful to introduce
a further simplifying assumption:
H2) the agents’ utility depends only on monetary income.
The agents considered here are the buyers and sellers of a given
homogeneous good. In order to keep the analytical framework as simple as
possible, further elementary assumptions must be introduced:
H3) the buyers’ net disposable income (i.e. the income that the buyers can
spend to purchase all the other goods after consumption of the
homogenous good) at the end of the reference period Γ is the difference
between the price paid for the good in each purchase and its reservation
price (i.e., Ybuyer =  Σγ RE γ –   Σγ (Pγ +  VAT Pγ) ; with REγ =
reservation price at time γ;   Pγ = price of the good bought at time γ; (γ =
1,…, Γ));
H4) the sellers’ total net income Yseller, computed at the end of a given
reference period Γ, depends exclusively on the total gross profit
extracted from each sale minus the profit tax (i.e., Yseller = ΩnetΓ = (Σγ
Pγ  − Σγ CTγ) (1 – t) ; with: ΩnetΓ = total net profit at time Γ; CTγ = total
9production costs at time γ; Pγ price of the good sold at time γ; (γ =
1,…, Γ); t = profit tax rate);
Given these assumptions, one can assume that in each period γ the agents
compare the sure choice, i.e. they do not collude and benefit from a sure
profit, if a seller, or pay the VAT and benefit from a sure net disposable
income level if a buyer, with the expected value (9H  obtained respectively
from profit tax evasion if a seller and from VAT evasion if a buyer. More
precisely, bearing in mind that the agent has only two choices: to collude, or
not to collude, and recalling the time independence assumption, if the agent
is a buyer we have:
( ) [ ]9$739$79$73(9 H
EX\HU
+)(  +  -1 = φpipi [2.1]
where:
pi is the probability that VAT evasion will be discovered;
VAT is the VAT rate;
φ9$7) is the punishment scheme.2
The buyer's problem, given [2.1], is simply a matter of making a
comparison between the value of H
EX\HU
(9  and the cost of paying the VAT.
As well known, in the very special case when H
EX\HU
(9
 = 9$73 the choice of
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 I assume that the penalty rate is imposed on evaded tax, an institutional feature common
in many developed countries.
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the buyer is conventionally assumed, by expected utility theory, to be
discriminatory between risk aversion and risk attraction.
Similarly, also the seller’s expected value from collusion can be
computed in the following way:
( ) ( )ΩΩ IW(9 H
VHOOHU
  +  -1 = pipi [2.2]
where:
ƒ (Ω) is the punishment scheme for the profit tax evasion.
Given 2.2, the decisional problem of the seller is exactly identical to the
buyer’s problem, i.e. it is a matter of comparison between his/her expected
value from collusion and the value of the profit tax that s/he can avoid
paying. On the other hand, the decisional task of the seller is somewhat
more complex than the one just described. The seller should in fact consider
the option to collude not only as a way to avoid to pay the profit tax, but
also as a competition device. The problem is obviously how to compute the
competitive advantage offered by collusion.
Finally, it is worth noting that the basic decisional frame does not change
even when we allow the seller to expropriate the VAT collected. Also in this
case, the problem is that of comparison between the expected value from
expropriation and the sure value of paying the yield to the state. The main
difference in this case is that we can assume that VAT expropriation is no
longer a dichotomous variable but that it can be “tuned” by the seller.
Nevertheless, the expected value formula does not change, except for the
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fact that instead of a “pay not pay” option we need a “how much to pay”
option.
7KHH[SHULPHQWDOGHVLJQ
The context modelled by the experiments discussed here is that of a
market of an homogeneous good with the following features:
1. Operating on the market are several sellers and buyers, each
characterised by different reservation values. The reservation value
for the buyers is depicted by a reservation price, while for the sellers
the reservation values are represented by their total production costs;
2. Neither the buyers nor the sellers can alter their reservation values;
3. Each agent (seller and buyer) can close only one transaction
(consisting of only one unit of the good) per each time period (round
of the game);
4. the experiment is carried out using computers; the experimental
subjects interact via a local net;
5. All relevant items of information are given only via the computer
screen;
6. Each subject receives a role at the beginning of the experiment –
seller or buyer – which does not change throughout the entire
experiment;
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7. Each subject receives an identification number at the beginning of
the experiment so that the subjects’ real identities are not known to
each other;
8. Each subject receives (via the computer screen) her/his “personal
information” i.e. her/his production cost if s/he is a seller, or her/his
reservation price if s/he is a buyer;
9. The money reward for the experimental subjects is given by the
difference between the actual value of the transaction and its cost of
production, or its reservation price, minus the indirect tax;
10. The sellers offer their good at the price that they believe most
advantageous, and the buyers can choose to buy from the list of
offers shown on the computer screen;
11. Similarly, also the sellers see the list of offers by their competitors;
12. The sellers as well as the buyers can try to collude with a potential
partner by clicking on a special button on the screen called
“collusion”; when this button is clicked two buttons appear on the
screen : “yes” and “no”; a subject who receives a proposal for
collusion can accept by clicking on the yes button or can refuse by
clicking on the no button;
13. Collusion is always total, i.e. it regards the entire amount of tax due
to the state, and it is a private relationship, so that the other players
cannot know if a given seller (or buyer) has already agreed to
collude with someone else;
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14. During the experiment a given number of transactions are monitored
by the fiscal authority, and if the subjects have colluded they must
pay a fine that will be deducted from their final rewards;
15. The expected value from collusion (i.e. the values of audit
probability and of the fine) is the same for both the sellers and the
buyers;
16. In correspondence to the equilibrium point the lottery is fair, i.e. the
expected value from evasion is equal to the sure choice value;
17. The subjects are informed about the fiscal audit probability and the
fine to pay;
18. If the sellers are allowed to expropriate the VAT collected, a special
window opens on? the computer screen: the “pay tax yield to the
state” window; when the subjects decide to expropriate VAT, they
must write only the amount of money that they have decided to pay
to the state in the window.
At the end of the experiment the subjects are informed about their final
money rewards, which may be worth up to a maximum of 50.000 Italian
Liras (about 25 Euros).
The experiments thus designed are very similar to the seminal
Chamberlin (1948) experiment, to Vernon Smith’s relatively more recent
competitive market experiment (1962), and to the version of these
experiments adopted by the Experimental Economics handbook by
Bergstrom and Miller (1997). As in these experiments, use of the neo-
classical offer-demand model of perfect competition permits the forecasting
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of equilibrium prices without collusion and with collusion. It is therefore
possible to check whether the behaviours of the subjects conform with the
expectations of the model. Furthermore, it allows investigation of issues not
strictly related to the economic apparatus anticipated in the introduction.
The most important of these topics is  that of the emergence of reputation
mechanisms, i.e. a willingness to collude that can be interpreted as the
commercial “style” of a given subject and which can be helped or hampered
by this reputation.
Four experiments have been carried out to date at the Computable and
Experimental Economics laboratory of the University of Trento:
a) experiment α1 and experiment α2 – base experiments carried out with 12
experimental subjects each, and assumed as the touchstone for
interpretation of the results from the other experiments;
b) experiment α3 – the same as experiments α1 and α2 but with 24
experimental subjects;
c) experiment α4 – intended to investigate the effects produced by allowing
the experimental subjects, who played the role of sellers, to keep the
money collected as indirect taxes; also in this case  24 experimental
subjects were used.
The experimental subjects were undergraduate students recruited by
means of announcements on the bulletin board of the Faculty of Economics.
Females  always made up 50% of the sample. Each experiment lasted 25
rounds.
The reservation values and the distribution of the reservation values
among the subjects for the experiments with 12 subjects are reported in
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figures 3.1 and 3.2. The production costs and the reservation values for the
experiments with 24 subjects were obtained by the same values used for the
experiments with 12 subjects multiplied by 2; therefore the curves are
identical but translated towards the right. Thus the equilibrium prices remain
the same while the equilibrium quantities increase.
Figs. 3.1 and 3.2 show that the only effect of including VAT is to
increase and broaden the range of the equilibrium prices.
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To return to the objectives of this research as described in the previous
sections, I was interested in the following issues:
a) analysis of the equilibrium values dynamic – comparison between the
equilibrium values (predicted by the theory without evasion) and the
observed behaviours;
b) analysis of the VAT expropriation phenomenon;
c) testing the “bomb crater” effect observed in the previous experiments on
income tax evasion (Mittone, 1999),
d) the emergence of “reputation” phenomena, i.e. consumer loyalty towards
a given seller.
To analyse the first two topics, it is useful to plot the equilibrium values
(i.e. the average prices) obtained from the experiments. Figures 4.1and 4.2
report the observed average prices obtained respectively from experiments
α1 and α2 and from experiments α3 and β1.
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On examining the figures one notes that the average prices are well
approximated by the equilibrium values computed  using the supply-demand
theory. Some few exceptions to this general result are be found in rounds 12
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and 24 of experiment α2 and in rounds 1, 3, 14 and 15 of experiment β1. It is
worth noting that the “anomalous” prices recorded in experiment α2 are
almost certainly due to some “error” committed by  subjects carrying out
their own business,3 while the anomalies registered in the prices of
experiment β1 are the result of a general tendency.
All the anomalous prices recorded in β1 fall below the expected
equilibrium prices, but this can be explained as a consequence of the more
general price tendency recorded in this experiment. On looking at the total
average prices computed without (by eliminating) the anomalous values we
find that in experiment α1 and α2 they are very close (respectively α1 =
120.7 and  α2 = 117 Italian Liras), while the same average prices computed
and “cleaned” by eliminating the anomalous prices for  experiments α3 and
β1.(i.e. the 24 subjects experiments) show a sensible difference (
respectively α3 = 136 and β1 = 101,9 Italian Liras).
It is difficult to obtain  statistical confirmation of the  difference between
the two experiments, because one cannot rule out that the individual values
are interrelated; that is, one cannot exclude with certainty that the
observations are independent. Therefore the most common statistical tests
used to check whether two samples of data belong to the same population
cannot be used. The only sure way to overcome the dependence of the
observations problem is to run many sessions of the experiment collecting a
large number of data. Another but less statistically rigorous way to try to
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 E.g. during round 24  subject “5” reported a loss of 525 Italian Liras because s/he agreed
to pay 500 Italian Liras for a good that for her/him had a value of 75 Italian liras. Similarly,
in round 12  experimental subject 6 reported a loss of 400 Italian Liras because s/he bought
for 500 Italian Liras a good that for her/him had a value of 100 Liras.
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overcome this problem is to assume independence between the observations
(which in our case is obviously a very weak assumption as we are treating
time series data) and then using a dependent samples non parametric test,
like the Wilcoxon signed ranks, or the Mann-Whitney test. The results from
these tests must therefore be read with many cautions and have only a
generically descriptive significance. On the other hand some of the
decisions taken by the subjects should be really independent from their past
behaviours as each round is for many aspects independent from the other.
For example the decision to collude should be independent from the past
decisions to collude unless we imagine that the subjects (but only the
sellers) use collusion as a competitive device.
The values of the Wilcoxon test computed for the (outliers free) data
from experiments α1 and α2 are shown in tab. 4.1 and do not allow rejection
of the null hypothesis (i.e. it is not possible to state that the samples do not
belong to the same statistical population), while the Wilcoxon test computed
for the experiments α3 and β1 allows  rejection of the null hypothesis (i.e.
one can state that the samples do not belong to the same statistical
population with an asymptotic significance of 0.000). An identical
conclusion can be obtained also from the Mann-Whitney test.
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H[SHULPHQWVα

α

RXWOLHUVIUHHDQGα

β

expα1-α2 expα3-β1
Wilcoxon Z -1.201 -4.292
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) .230 .000
Mann-Whitney U 257.000 48.000
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) .529 .000
A generalized price reduction therefore seemed to be the main effect
produced by allowing the subjects to expropriate VAT. A possible
explanation for this phenomenon is that the sellers decided to systematically
expropriate VAT, considering this option as a way to reduce their
productions costs and therefore allowing them a more “aggressive” price
competition. In fig. 4.3 the average VAT expropriation values per round
have been added to the average prices to check whether the just described
intuition was correct.
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The VAT expropriation + price line demonstrates quite clearly that at
least one of the sellers in experiment β1 decided in every round to
expropriate the tax yield collected by her/his buyers. The new line
approximates the average price line computed for experiment α1, and the
VAT expropriation + price level is almost constantly higher that the average
price recorded in experiment α1. On the other hand, it is to be noted that the
VAT expropriation does not modify the average prices dynamic in a way
coherent with the “real” price dynamic of experiment α3. In fact, if we
compute the Wilcoxon signed ranks test we discover, always remembering
the statistical limits of this test when applied to time series data, that the two
data sets still seemingly belonged to different statistical populations.
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α3−β1+VAT exp
Wilcoxon Z -4.238
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) .000
The price-VAT expropriation strategy implemented by the sellers in
experiment β1 makes it difficult to reach firm conclusions about the
psychological constraint that the VAT stealing should produce if it is
perceived as a damage caused to the welfare of the other participants in the
experiment. In fact, by offering prices lower than those offered in α3 the
sellers of experiment β1 implicitly shared with the buyers the advantage
provided by the opportunity to expropriate the VAT. Furthermore, and
conversely to the case of collusion, they alone  run the risk of being
punished by the fiscal audit, so that their behaviour can paradoxically be
seen as “altruistic” because they share the advantage offered by VAT
expropriation (through a reduction of the prices) without imposing the risk
of paying a fine. On the other hand, we cannot rule out that this strategy was
only a matter of price competition, and therefore that no psychological
complication really arose in conditioning the decision to expropriate the
VAT yield.
The third and fourth questions raised at the outset concerned the
emergence of the reputation effect, and the existence of a “bomb crater”
effect, also in the VAT evasion context. The reputation effect can be
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analyzed by looking at tab 4.3, which reports the results from  experiments
α1 and α2.
Table 4.3 shows that “lock in” phenomena between sellers and buyers are
quite common. For example, in experiment α1 subject 2 (seller) and subject
7 (buyer) closed 7 contracts out of a total of 16 (43.75 %) closed by subject
2; and in experiment α2 subject 1 (seller) and subject 7 (buyer) closed 8
contract out of a total of 17 (47.06%).
Another interesting aspect of the competition strategy regards the
collusion proposal as a non-price competition tool. Tab. 4.4. reports the
number of collusions proposed and realized respectively by the sellers and
by the buyers. It seems from the results obtained from the first experiment
(α1)  that the sellers used the collusion proposal as a way to attract the
buyers. Out of a total of 79 collusion proposals 46 were made by sellers and
only 33 by  buyers. On the other hand, this result is completely different
from the one obtained from  experiment α2 , where the buyers made 47
collusion proposals out of a total of 65.
It seems therefore that the collusion proposal was interpreted by the
experimental subjects as a competitive mechanism on the supply side, or as
a way to save money by evading  VAT on the demand side. It is worth
noting that these two different interpretations of collusion in the two
experiments seem to show that some form of internal coordination among
the experimental subjects may arise. In other words, one can hypothesize
that the task of proposing collusion becomes mainly a matter of a given role
(seller or buyer) in accordance with some spontaneous selection of
behaviors during the first stages of the game. In other words it seemed that
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at the beginning of the game the players, through a sort of spontaneous
coordination, decide to attribute the role of proposing collusion to the sellers
or to the buyers, then this role remains assigned till the end of the
experiment. To check this hypothesis one should analyze the initial rounds
of each experiment to see whether the dynamic of the collusion proposals
follows a different pattern in the initial stages of the experiments.
7DE5HSXWDWLRQHIIHFWH[SHULPHQWVαDQGα
([SHULPHQWα (number of transactions)
%X\HUV        WRW
6HOOHUV 2 3 5 4 2 6 3 25
 2 6 4 3 0 2 1 18
 2 2 7 0 2 2 1 16
 3 0 2 4 6 3 2 20
 5 2 2 1 4 0 6 20
       
 8.00 12.00 20.00 16.00 8.00 24.00 12.00
 11.11  22.22 16.67 0.00 11.11 5.56
 12.50 12.50  0.00 12.50 12.50 6.25
 15.00 0.00 10.00 20.00  15.00 10.00
 25.00 10.00 10.00 5.00 20.00 0.00 
26
([SHULPHQWα (number of transactions)
%X\HUV        WRW
6HOOHUV 1 3 1 8 3 1 3 20
 1 1 8 0 2 0 5 17
 6 4 3 0 5 3 0 21
 3 2 1 2 2 5 1 16
 3 7 2 1 4 1 4 22
       
 5.00 15.00 5.00  15.00 5.00 15.00
 5.88 5.88  0.00 11.76 0.00 29.41
 28.57 19.05 14.29 0.00 23.81 14.29 0.00
 18.75 12.50 6.25 12.50 12.50  6.25
 13.64  9.09 4.55 18.18 4.55 18.18
7DE&ROOXVLRQH[SHULPHQWVαDQGα
([SHULPHQWα 3OD\HU 1XPEHU7UDQVDFWLRQV 1XPEHU&ROOXVLRQ &ROOXVLRQ3URSRVDO
6HOOHUV 0 25 4 12
1 18 3 6
2 16 3 9
3 20 3 7
4 20 2 12
7RWDOVHOOHUV    
%X\HUV 5 14 0 3
6 13 2 4
7 20 2 5
8 12 4 9
9 14 0 2
10 13 1 2
11 13 6 8
7RWDOEX\HUV    
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([SHULPHQWα 3OD\HU 1XPEHU7UDQVDFWLRQV 1XPEHU&ROOXVLRQV &ROOXVLRQ3URSRVDO
6HOOHUV 0 20 0 0
1 17 0 1
2 21 2 3
3 16 2 3
4 22 7 11
7RWDOVHOOHUV    
%X\HUV 5 14 0 10
6 17 1 3
7 15 0 1
8 11 0 0
9 16 5 11
10 10 2 10
11 13 3 12
7RWDOEX\HUV    
    
It is more difficult is to investigate  the attitude toward risk displayed by
the experimental subjects. The difficulty arises mainly from the fact that the
fiscal audits were randomized so that each subject could be audited in
different rounds of the game. On average, when a tax audit is carried out 3
to 4 transactions are investigated in  experiments with 12 subjects, and  7 to
8 transactions in  experiments with 24 subjects, which means that whenever
an audit is performed about  50-60% of the subjects are checked. The
aggregated results can therefore be used to test the bomb crater effect, even
though one may expect  it to be less marked than in  the income tax
experiments, where all the subjects where  investigated simultaneously
(Mittone, 1999). Figure 4.4 shows one of the plots obtained from the
experiments on income tax evasion  for the sake of comparison. Figs. 4.5,
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4.6, 4.7 and 4.8 give the graphs from experiment α1, α2, α3, and β1
respectively.
Fig. 4.4 Experiment on income tax evasion
Tax payments (averages)
Source: Mittone 1999
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Fig. 4.5 Collusions, proposals and fiscal audits
experiment a1 
ROUND
252321191715131197531
A
ve
ra
ge
s
100
80
60
40
20
0
Collusion
PROPOSAL
CONTROL
Fig. 4.6  Collusions, proposals and fiscal audits
Experiment a2
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Fig. 4.7  Collusions, proposals and fiscal audits
Experiment a3
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Fig. 4.8 Collusions, proposals and fiscal audits
Experiment b1
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All the graphs shown in figs. 4.5; 4.6; 4.7; 4.8 report whether the subjects
have been audited (variable “control”); whether they have proposed
collusion (variable “proposal”); and whether they have actually colluded
(variable “collusion”). Fig. 4.4 shows the results from one of the income tax
evasion experiments and reports the amount of tax due (variable “tax”), the
amount of tax actually paid by the subjects (variable “avg. tax paid”), and
whether the subjects have been audited (variable audit).
One notes from the figures  that the bomb crater effect is present and
very strong in all the experiments, albeit with  different degrees of
regularity. The different degrees of magnitude and regularity are probably
due to the fact that in the VAT evasion experiments the subjects  audited
were always different.
Finally, it is worth noting that the degree of success of  collusion
proposals may act as an incentive for further attempts to collude.
3UHOLPLQDU\FRQFOXVLRQV
The results from the experiments carried out thus far have not yet been
completely analyzed, and it is therefore not possible to reach firm
conclusions. Nevertheless, some phenomena seem to emerge  quite clearly
from the data. The first result is that the opportunity to expropriate VAT
produces noticeable effects on the equilibrium prices and is seen as an
opportunity by both the sellers and the buyers to modify their bargaining
strategies.
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The second result is that the individual choices regarding collusion and
risk may be very different, but at the same time it seems that some form of
social consensus, at least on who must suggest collusion, emerges
spontaneously in the experimental subjects.
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